The language of linear temporal logic can be interpreted over the class of dynamic topological systems, giving rise to the intuitionistic temporal logic ITL c ♦∀ , recently shown to be decidable by Fernández-Duque. In this article we axiomatize this logic, some fragments, and prove completeness for several familiar spaces. * joseph.boudou@matabio.net † dieguez@enib.fr ‡ david.fernandezduque@ugent.be that a logic with 'next', 'eventually' and 'henceforth' was decidable over the class of all dynamical systems based on a poset (see §3). These results have led us to recast the dynamic topological logic project in terms of intuitionistic temporal logics.
Introduction
The dynamic topological logic project originated in the work of Artemov et al. [2] , who suggested that modal logic may be used to reason about dynamic topological systems (X, f ) using the 'interior' modality (in the sense of Tarski [34] ) and the 'next' • modality to reason about the action of f . Kremer and Mints [26] later observed that 'henceforh' could be used to model the asymptotic behavior of f , allowing one to represent phenomena such as the Poincaré recurrence theorem [31] . The resulting tri-modal system was called dynamic topological logic (DTL), and it was studied for some time with expectations that it may be applicable in e.g. automated theorem proving. However, interest in DTL waned after Konev et al. [24] showed that the validity problem for DTL formulas is undecidable.
In unpublished work, Kremer [25] also suggested an intuitionistic version of DTL, based on 'next' and 'henceforth'; no interior modality is required in this setting, as the topology is reflected in the semantics for implication. Years later, Fernández-Duque [19] showed that a mild variant based on 'next', 'eventually' and a universal modality was decidable over the class of all dynamical systems, and Boudou et al. [6] showed In the LTL setting, a moment is simply a maximal consistent subset of a suitable finite set Σ of formulas. For us a moment is instead a finite labelled tree, and the formula χ(w) must characterize w up to simulation; for this reason we will henceforth write Sim(w) instead of χ(w). The required formulas Sim(w) can readily be constructed in our language (Proposition 6.4).
Note that it is failure of Sim(w) that characterizes the property of simulating w, hence the possible states will be those moments w such that Sim(w) is unprovable. The set of possible moments will form a quasimodel falsifying a given unprovable formula ϕ (Corollary 8.3), from which it follows that such a ϕ is falsified on some model as well (Theorem 4.8) . Thus any unprovable formula is falsifiable, and Theorem 8.4 follows.
Our proof will be presented in such a way that completeness for the sub-logics ITL 0
• (whose only modality is •) and ITL 0 ♦ (whith • and ♦) are obtained as partial results. Once we have established our main completeness theorem, we will consider special classes of dynamical systems for which our logics are also complete. In summary, we obtain the following results.
ITL 0
• and ITL 0 ♦ are sound and complete for the class of expanding posets, for dynamical systems based on R n for any fixed n ≥ 2, and for the Cantor space.
The logics ITL FS
• and ITL FS •∀ are sound and complete for the class of persistent posets.
3. The logic ITL 0 ♦∀ is sound and complete for both the class of all dynamical systems and of all dynamical systems based on Q.
In contrast, we will also show that ITL 0
• is incomplete for R.
Layout
Section 2 reviews some basic notions regarding partial orders and topology and Section 3 introduces the syntax and semantics of ITL c ♦ . Section 4 then discusses labelled structures, which generalize both models and quasimodels. Section 5 discusses the canonical model, which properly speaking is only a deterministic weak quasimodel but is sufficient to establish completeness results for logics over the language L • . Section 6 reviews simulations and dynamic simulations, including their definability in the intuitionistic language. Section 7 constructs the initial quasimodel and establishes its basic properties, but the fact that it is actually a quasimodel is proven only in Section 8 where it is shown that the quasimodel is ω-sensible, i.e. it satisfies the required condition to interpret ♦. The completeness of ITL 0 ♦ follows from this. In Section 9 we extend our axiomatization for languages with the universal modality and prove that the logic ITL 0 ♦∀ is complete. In Section 10 we prove via an unwinding construction that any L ♦ -formula falsifiable on a quasimodel is also falsifiable on an expanding poset, from which we conclude that ITL 0 ♦ is complete for this class of systems, and in Section 11 show how to adapt results for DTL to our setting, obtaining completeness results for Q, R n and the Cantor space. Finally, Section 12 provides some concluding remarks.
Posets and Topology
We assume familiarity with topological spaces and related concepts; the necessary background may be found in a text such as [29] . Topological spaces will typically be denoted X = (|X|, T X ), i.e. |X| is the set of points of X and T X the family of open sets; we will generally adopt the convention of denoting the domain of a stucture S by |S|. We denote the interior of A ⊆ |X| by A • and its closure by A.
We will also work with posets and it will be convenient to view them as a special case of topological spaces. As usual, a poset is a pair A = (|A|, A ), where |A| is any set and A ⊆ |A| × |A| is a reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric relation. We write instead of A when this does not lead to confusion, and write a ≺ b for a b but b a. If B ⊆ |A|, A ↾ B is the structure obtained by restricting each component of A to B, so that A ↾ B = (B, A ∩ (B × B)). Similar conventions apply to other classes of structures, so that for example if X is a topological space and Y ⊆ |X| then X ↾ Y is Y equipped with the subspace topology.
If W is a poset, consider the topology U on |W| given by setting U ⊆ |W| to be open if and only if, whenever w ∈ U and v w, we have that v ∈ U . We call U the up-set topology of . Topological spaces of this form are Aleksandroff spaces [1] , which are fundamental for our completeness proof. If W, V are preorders then it is not hard to check that g : |W| → |V| is continuous with respect to the up-set topologies on W, V if and only if v W w implies that g(v) V g(w).
Syntax and Semantics
Fix a countably infinite set P of propositional variables. The full (intuitionistic temporal) language L * is defined by the grammar (in Backus-Naur form)
where p ∈ P. Here, • is read as 'next', ♦ as 'eventually', as 'henceforth' and ∀ as 'everywhere'; note that this is a universal modality and not a quantifier. We also use ¬ϕ as a shorthand for ϕ → ⊥ and ϕ ↔ ψ as a shorthand for (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ); we remark that the exitential modality is definable by ∃ϕ := ¬∀¬ϕ [19] . We denote the set of subformulas of ϕ ∈ L * by sub(ϕ).
The sublanguage of L * which only allows modalities in M ⊆ {♦, , ∀} is denoted L M , where we omit brackets and commas when writing M . For purposes of this article, a temporal language is any language of this form. Note that L M always contains Booleans, • and implication, even though they will not be listed in M . We write L • instead of L ∅ (i.e., the language whose only modality is •).
Next we define our semantics, based on dynamical systems.
A dynamical system X equipped with a valuation · X is a (dynamical topological) model.
Validity is then defined in the usual way:
Given a model X and a formula ϕ ∈ L * , we say that ϕ is valid on
If Ω is a class of dynamical systems or models, we say that ϕ ∈ L * is valid on Ω if, for every X ∈ Ω, X |= ϕ. If ϕ is not valid on Ω, it is falsifiable on Ω.
For a temporal language L M and a class of dynamical systems Ω we define the logic ITL Ω M to be the set of formulas of L M that are valid over Ω.
As before we write ITL Ω • instead of ITL Ω ∅ . Some classes of interest are the class c of all dynamical systems, the class o of all dynamical systems with a (continuous and) open map, the class e of all dynamical systems based on a poset (which we call expanding posets), and the class p = e ∩ o of persistent posets. If X is a topological space, ITL X M denotes the set of L M -formulas valid on the class of dynamical systems of the form (X, f ). Let us see that ϕ is valid on R but not over all dynamical systems. Suppose that (R, f, · ) is a model based on R and that x ∈ ¬•p ∧ •¬¬p . From x ∈ •¬¬p and the semantics of double negation (discussed in [19] ) we see that there is a neighbourhood V of f (x) such that V ⊆ p . It follows from the intermediate value theorem that if U is a neighbourhood of x and f (U ) is not a singleton, f (U ) ∩ V contains an open set and hence f (U )∩ p = ∅. Meanwhile, from x ∈ ¬•p we see that x has a neighbourhood U * such that f (U * ) ∩ p = ∅, hence for such a U * we must have that f (U * ) is the singleton {f (x)}. But then either f (x) ∈ q and x ∈ •q , or else f (x) ∈ q , which means that U * ∩ •q = ∅ and thus U * witnesses that x ∈ ¬•q . In either case,
On the other hand, consider the plane R 2 with the projection function π(x, y) = x, and let p be the complement of the x axis and q the complement of the y axis. It is not hard to check that 0 ∈ ϕ .
Note that the formula ϕ tells us that ITL R • does not enjoy Craig interpolation. The use of R 2 in this example is not accidental: as we will see, any L ♦ -formula that is valid on R 2 is valid over the class of all topological spaces. Note that this is no longer the case for ϕ ∈ L ♦∀ [19] .
Axiomatic systems
Our deductive calculi are obtained from propositional intuitionistic logic [28] by adding standard axioms and inference rules of LTL [27] , although some modifications are needed to present them in terms of ♦ instead of . For our purposes, a logic is a set of axioms and rules defining a subset of some temporal language L. We say that Λ ′ extends Λ if the language of Λ ′ contains that of Λ and Λ ′ is closed under all substitution instances of the axioms and rules defining Λ.
Let us first give two axiomatizations for L • . The logic ITL FS • (for Fischer Servi) is the least set of L • -formulas closed under the the axioms of Intuitionistic Propositional Logic [28] plus the following axioms and inference rules:
All of the above axioms for • are standard for a functional modality. We also define the logic ITL 0
• by omitting axiom (N5), which is not valid over the class of dynamical systems, although it is valid over the class of open systems [7] . In contrast, we can derive the converses of the other axioms. Below, for a set of formulas Γ we define •Γ = {•ϕ : ϕ ∈ Γ}, and empty conjunctions and disjunctions are defined by ∅ = ⊤ and ∅ = ⊥. Lemma 3.4. Let L be a temporal language and Λ be a logic over L extending ITL 0
• . Let Γ ⊆ L be finite. Then, the following are derivable in Λ:
Proof. One direction is obtained from repeated use of axioms (N2) or (N3) and the other is proven using (NR2) and (N4); note that the second claim requires (N1) to treat the case when Γ = ∅. Details are left to the reader.
Next we define the logic ITL 0 ♦ by extending ITL 0 • with the following axioms and rules.
The rule (ER1) replaces the dual Kaxiom (ϕ → ψ) → (♦ϕ → ♦ψ) common in intuitionistic modal logic, while (ER2) is dual to the induction rule ϕ→•ϕ ϕ→ ϕ . Of course we could also consider a logic ITL FS ♦ which includes axiom (N5), but we do not have any completeness results for this logic. Proof. Reasoning within ITL 0 ♦ , note that ϕ → ♦ϕ holds by (E1) and propositional reasoning, hence •ϕ → •♦ϕ by (NR2), (N4) and (NR1). In a similar way, •♦ϕ → ♦ϕ holds by (E1) and propositional reasoning, so • • ♦ϕ → •♦ϕ does by (NR2), (N4) and (NR1). Hence, •ϕ∨••♦ϕ → •♦ϕ holds. Using (N3) and some propositional reasoning we obtain
Finally, we define the logics ITL 0 ∀ and ITL 0 ♦∀ by extending ITL 0 and ITL 0 ♦ , respetively, with the following axioms and rule.
The reader may observe that these axioms are designed to make the universal modality behave classically; indeed this is not surprising, as the only truth values that ∀ϕ can take are the whole space or the empty set. With the exception of (N5), we will assume that all of the above rules and axioms are available when relevant. Definition 3.6. An admissible intuitionistic temporal logic is any logic Λ over a temporal language L M such that Λ extends ITL 0 M . As usual, a logic Λ is sound for a class of structures Ω if, whenever Λ ⊢ ϕ, it follows that Ω |= ϕ. The following is essentially proven in [7] : Theorem 3.7. ITL 0 ♦∀ is sound for the class of dynamical systems. Note however that a few of the axioms and rules have been modified to fall within L ♦ , but these modifications are innocuous and their correctness may be readily checked by the reader. We will see that every admissible intuitionistic temporal logic is also complete for the class of dynamic topological systems.
Labelled structures
The central ingredient of our completeness proof is given by non-deterministic quasimodels, introduced by Fernández-Duque [12] in the context of dynamic topological logic and later adapted to intuitionistic temporal logic [19] .
Two-sided types
Our presentation will differ slightly from that of [19] , since it will be convenient for us to use two-sided types, defined as follows.
Definition 4.1. Let Σ ⊆ L ♦∀ be closed under subformulas and Φ + , Φ − ⊆ Σ be finite sets of formulas. We say that the pair Φ = (Φ + ; Φ − ) is a two-sided Σ-type if:
Whenever Ξ is an expression denoting a two-sided type, we write Ξ + and Ξ − to denote its components. We will consider three partial orders on T Σ . We will write
Remark 4.2. Fernández-Duque [19] uses one-sided Σ-types, but it is readily checked that a one-sided type Φ as defined there can be regarded as a saturated two-sided type Ψ by setting Ψ + = Φ and Ψ − = Σ \ Φ. Henceforth we will write type instead of two-sided type and explicitly write one-sided type when discussing [19] .
Many times we want Σ to be finite, and to indicate this, given ∆ ⊆ L * we write Σ ⋐ ∆ if Σ ⊆ ∆ is finite and closed under subformulas. Note that T Σ is partially ordered by ⊆, and we will endow it with the up-set topology
The set of defects of Φ will be denoted ∂Φ.
If W is a labelled space, elements of |W| will sometimes be called worlds. As usual, we may write ℓ instead of ℓ W when this does not lead to confusion. Since we have endowed T Σ with the topology U ⊆ , the continuity of ℓ means that for every
Note that not every subset U of |W| gives rise to a substructure that is also a labelled space; however, this is the case when U is open. The following is not hard to check.
For our purposes, a continuous relation on a topological space is a relation under which the preimage of any open set is open; note that this is not the standard definition of a contiuous relation. In the context of an Alexandroff space with the up-set topology, a continuous relation S is one that satisfies the forward confluence property:
Given Σ ⊆ L ♦∀ closed under subformulas, any dynamic topological model can be regarded as a well Σ-labelled system. If X is a model, we can assign a saturated Σ-type ℓ X (x) to x given by ℓ X (x) = {ψ ∈ Σ : x ∈ ψ X } . We also set S X = f X ; it is obvious that ℓ X is honest and S X is ω-sensible. Henceforth we will tacitly identify X by its associated well L ♦∀ -labelled system. However, not all labelled systems we are interested in arise from models: another useful class of labelled systems is given by quasimodels.
Definition 4.6. Given Σ ⊆ L ♦∀ closed under subformulas, a weak Σ-quasimodel is a Σ-labelled system Q such that T Q is equal to the up-set topology for a partial order which we denote Q . If moreover Q is a well Σ-labelled system, then we say that Q is a Σ-quasimodel.
Note that quasimodels are very close to models, except that the relation S may be non-deterministic. Indeed, deterministic quasimodels are essentially models. The following can be checked by a standard structural induction on ϕ.
Lemma 4.7. Let Σ ⊆ L ♦∀ be closed under subformulas and Q be an honest, deterministic Σ-quasimodel.
Define a valuation · Q on Q by setting p Q = {w ∈ W : p ∈ ℓ(w) + } and extending to all of L recursively. Then, for all formulas ϕ ∈ L ♦ and for all w ∈ W ,
In the non-deterministic case quasimodels are not models as they stand, but in [19] , it is shown that dynamical systems can be extracted from them.
the class of dynamic topological systems if and only if it is satisfiable (falsifiable) over the class of saturated, finite, sub(ϕ)-quasimodels.
Note that [19] uses quasimodels with one-sided types, but in view of Remark 4.2, the theorem can easily be modified to obtain quasimodels with two-sided types. Twosided types will be more convenient for us, especially in Section 10. Below, recall that for a structure A and U ⊆ |A|, A ↾ U is the substructure of A obtained by restricting all functions and relations of A to U .
Proof. By Lemma 4.4 we know that Q ↾ U is a labelled frame, while S Q↾U is clearly sensible. Since U is open and S Q is continuous, S Q↾U is continuous as well. Thus it remains to show that S Q↾U is serial and ω-sensible, which in the first case holds by assumption and in the second follows easily from S Q already having these properties.
As usual, if ϕ is not derivable, we wish to produce a model where ϕ is falsified, but in view of Theorem 4.8, it suffices to falsify ϕ on a quasimodel. This is convenient, as quasimodels are much easier to construct than models.
The canonical model
In this section we construct a standard canonical model for any logic Λ extending ITL 0
• . From this we will obtain some completeness results for logics over L • . However, in the presence of ♦, the standard canonical model is only a saturated, weak, deterministic quasimodel rather than a proper model. Nevertheless, the canonical model will later be a useful ingredient in our completeness proofs for ITL 0 ♦ and ITL 0 ♦∀ . Since we are working over an intuitionistic logic, the role of maximal consistent sets will be played by prime types, as defined below.
Definition 5.1. Let L be a temporal language and Λ a logic over L. Given two sets of formulas Γ and ∆, we say that ∆ is a consequence of Γ (with respect to Λ), denoted
We say that a pair of sets
The set of prime L-types will be denoted T ∞ L . Note that we are using the standard interpretation of Γ ⊢ ∆ in Gentzen-style calculi. The logic Λ will always be clear from context, which is why we do not reflect it in the notation. When working within a turnstyle, we will follow the usual proof-theoretic conventions of writing Γ, ∆ instead of Γ ∪ ∆ and ϕ instead of {ϕ}. Observe that there is no clash in terminology regarding the use of the word type:
Proof. Let Φ be a prime L-type. Observe that Φ is already saturated by definition, so it remains to check that it satisfies all conditions of Definition 4.1.
Conditions 1 and 2 follow from the consistency of Φ. The proofs of the other conditions are all similar to each other. For example, for 7, suppose that
The rest of the conditions are left to the reader.
As with maximal consistent sets, prime types satisfy a Lindenbaum property. Proof. The proof is standard, but we provide a sketch. Let ϕ ∈ L. Note that either Γ, ϕ ⊢ ∆ or Γ ⊢ ∆, ϕ, for otherwise by a cut rule (which is intuitionistically derivable) we would have Γ ⊢ ∆. Thus we can add ϕ to Γ ∪ ∆, and by repeating this process for each element of L ♦ (or using Zorn's lemma) we can find suitable Φ.
Given a set A, let I A denote the identity function on A. Let Λ be an admissible temporal logic over L. The canonical model M Λ for Λ is defined as the labelled structure
in other words, M Λ is the set of prime types with the usual ordering and successor relations. Note that ℓ Λ is just the identity (i.e., ℓ Λ (Φ) = Φ). We will usually omit writing ℓ Λ , as it has no effect on its argument.
Next we show that M Λ is a saturated, weak, deterministic quasimodel. For this, we must prove that it has all the required properties. Proof. We know that T is a partial order and restrictions of partial orders are partial orders, so Λ is a partial order. Proof. For a set Γ ⊆ L ♦ , recall that we have defined •Γ = {•ϕ : ϕ ∈ Γ}. It will be convenient to introduce the notation ⊖Γ = {ϕ : •ϕ ∈ Γ}. With this, we show that S Λ is functional and forward-confluent.
FUNCTIONALITY. We claim that for all Φ, Ψ ∈ |M Λ |,
We must check that
Next we check that Ψ is consistent. If not, let Γ ⊆ Ψ + and ∆ ⊆ Ψ − be finite and such that Γ → ∆ is derivable. Using (NR2) and (N4) we see that • Γ → • ∆ is derivable, which in view of Lemma 3.4 implies that •Γ → •∆ is derivable as well. But •Γ ⊆ Φ + and •∆ ⊆ Φ − , contradicting the fact that Φ is consistent.
Thus Ψ ∈ |M Λ |, and Φ S Λ Ψ holds provided that Φ S T Ψ. It is clear that clauses 1) and 2) of Definition 4.5 hold. If ♦ϕ ∈ Φ + (so that ♦ ∈ M ) and ϕ ∈ Φ + , it follows that ϕ ∈ Φ − . By Lemma 3.5 ♦ϕ → ϕ ∨ •♦ϕ is derivable, so we cannot have that •♦ϕ ∈ Φ − and hence •♦ϕ ∈ Φ + , so that ♦ϕ ∈ Ψ + . Similarly, if ♦ϕ ∈ Φ − we have that •♦ϕ ∈ Φ − , for otherwise we obtain a contradiction from (E1). Therefore, ♦ϕ ∈ Ψ − as well. The clauses for ∀ϕ follow a similar line of reasoning using (UA6).
To check that Ψ is unique, suppose that Θ ∈ |M Λ | is such that Φ S Λ Θ. Then if ϕ ∈ Ψ + it follows from (1) that •ϕ ∈ Φ + and hence ϕ ∈ Θ + ; by the same argument, if ϕ ∈ Ψ − it follows that ϕ ∈ Θ − , and hence Θ = Ψ.
CONTINUITY: Now that we have shown that S Λ is a function, we may treat it as such.
Using Lemma 3.4, (N5) and propositional reasoning, this gives us
∆ would be an intuitionistic tautology witnessing that Ψ is inconsistent, contrary to our assumption. We conclude that Θ ′ is consistent, hence it can be extended to a prime type Θ using the Lindenbaum lemma, and clearly Φ Λ Θ S Λ Ψ, as required. Figure 1 : If E ⊆ |X| × |Y| is a dynamical simulation, this diagram can always be completed.
Proposition 5.6. Let Λ be an admissible temporal logic over L. Then, the canonical model for Λ is a deterministic weak quasimodel.
Proof. We need 1. (|M Λ |, Λ , ℓ Λ ) to be a labelled frame, 2. S Λ to be a sensible forward-confluent function, and 3. ℓ Λ to have T L as its codomain. The first item is Lemma 5.4. That S Λ is a forward-confluent function is Lemma 5.5, and it is sensible since
From this we may already obtain our first completeness results. Proof. Let Λ be either ITL 0
• or ITL FS • . By the Lindenbaum lemma 5.3, if Λ ⊢ ϕ then there is Φ ∈ |M Λ | such that ϕ ∈ Φ − . By Proposition 5.6 M Λ is a deterministic, weak quasimodel falsifying ϕ, and moreover it is trivially ω-sensible as ♦ is not in our language. By Lemma 4.7, ϕ is not valid over the class of expanding posets, as required. In the case that Λ = ITL FS • , we additionally use the fact that S Λ is open, so that M Λ is persistent.
Simulation formulas
Simulations are relations between labelled spaces, and give rise to the appropriate notion of 'substructure' for modal and intuitionistic logics. We have used them to prove that ITL c ♦∀ has the finite quasimodel property [19] , and they will also be useful for our completeness proof. Below, recall that Φ ⊆ T Ψ means that Φ − ⊆ Ψ − and Φ + ⊆ Ψ + .
The relation E is a dynamic simulation between X and Y if S Y E ⊆ ES X .
Next we show that there exist formulas defining points in finite frames up to simulability, i.e. that if W is a finite frame and w ∈ |W|, there exists a formula Sim(w) such that for all labelled frames M and all x ∈ |M|, M, x |= x if and only if (W, w) ⇀ (M, x). In contrast, simulability formulas for finite S4 models are not definable in the classical modal language [14] , but they can be constructed using a polyadic extension of the modal language representing the tangled closure of a family of sets [15, 20, 21] and expressively equivalent to the µ-calculus over S4 frames [9] .
Fernández-Duque [17] uses simulation formulas to axiomatize the resulting polyadic extension of DTL; in contrast, the natural axiomatization suggested by Kremer and Mints [26] of dynamic topological logic is incomplete [18] . In the intuitionistic setting the situation is simplified somewhat, as finite frames [10] (and hence models) are already definable up to simulation in the intuitionistic language. This may be surprising, as the intuitionistic language is less expressive than the modal language; however, intuitionistic models are posets rather than arbitrary preorders, and this allows us to define simulability formulas by recursion on ≺. Definition 6.2. Fix Σ ⋐ L ♦∀ and let W be a finite Σ-labelled frame. Given w ∈ |W|, we define a formula Sim(w) by backwards induction on = W by Proof. Each claim is proved by backward induction on .
(1) Let us first consider the base case, when there is no v ≻ w. Assume that Sim(w) ∈ ℓ − (x). From the definition of labelled frame ℓ + W (w) ∈ ℓ + X (y) and ℓ − W (w) ∈ ℓ − X (y) for some y x. From the definition of type it follows that ℓ +
For the inductive step, let us assume that the lemma holds for all v ≻ w. Assume that Sim(w) ∈ ℓ − X (x). From the definition of labelled frame, it follows that
for some y x. Following similar reasoning as in the base case we can conclude that ℓ W (w) ⊆ ℓ X (y), and moreover, that Sim(v) ∈ ℓ − X (y) for all v ≻ w. By induction hypothesis we conclude that for all v ≻ w, there exists a simulation
The reader may check that E is a simulation and that w E y x, so that (W, w) ⇀ (X, y), as needed.
(2) For the base case, assume that (W, w) ⇀ (X, y) for some y x, so there exists a simulation E such that w E y. It follows that ℓ + W (w) ⊆ ℓ + X (y) and ℓ − W (w) ⊆ ℓ − X (y). From conditions 3 and 5 of the definition of type (Definition 4.1), it follows that ℓ + W (w) ∈ ℓ − X (y) and ℓ − W (w) ∈ ℓ + X (y). But then, condition 7 gives us Sim(w) ∈ ℓ + X (y), so Sim(w) ∈ ℓ + X (x). For the inductive step, by the same reasoning as in the base case it follows that
Since v was arbitrary we conclude that v≻w Sim(v) ∈ ℓ + (y). Finally, from condition 7 of Definition 4.1 and the fact that y x we get that Sim(w) ∈ ℓ + (x). Remark 6.5. Proposition 6.4 more generally holds when X is any labelled space (not necessarily Aleksandroff) , but this restricted version will suffice for our purposes.
The initial quasimodel
In this section we review the initial weak quasimodel I Σ [19] and use it to define an initial quasimodel J Σ . These structures are 'initial' in the sense that if A is any labelled system, there exist surjective simulations from both I Σ and J Σ to A, i.e., they are initial in a category-theoretic sense.
Theorem 7.1. Given Σ ⋐ L ♦∀ , there exists a finite, saturated weak quasimodel I Σ such that if A is any deterministic weak quasimodel then ⇀ ⊆ |I Σ |×|A| is a surjective dynamic simulation.
We do not need to elaborate on the construction of I Σ here, but this is done in detail in [19] . Points of I Σ are called moments. One can think of I Σ as a finite initial structure over the category of labelled weak quasimodels. Next, we will internalize the notion of simulating elements of I Σ into the temporal language. This is achieved by the formulas Sim(w).
Proposition 7.2. Let Λ be a logic extending ITL 0
• over a temporal language L. Fix Σ ⋐ L and let I = I Σ , w ∈ |I| and ψ ∈ Σ.
Proof. 1) First assume that ψ ∈ ℓ − (w), and toward a contradiction that ψ → Sim(w). By the Lindenbaum lemma there is Γ ∈ |M Λ | such that ψ → Sim(w) ∈ Γ − . Thus for some Θ Λ Γ we have that ψ ∈ Θ + and Sim(w) ∈ Θ − . But then by Proposition 6.4 we have that (W, w) ⇀ (M Λ , ∆) for some ∆ Λ Θ, so that ψ ∈ ∆ − , and by monotonicity ψ ∈ Θ − , contradicting the consistency of Θ.
2) If ψ ∈ ℓ + (w), we proceed similarly. Assume toward a contradiction that ψ → Sim(w) → Sim(w). Then, reasoning as above there is Θ ∈ |M Λ | such that ψ → Sim(w) ∈ Θ + and Sim(w) ∈ Θ − . From Proposition 6.4 we see that there is ∆ c Θ such that (W, w) ⇀ (M Λ , ∆), so that ψ ∈ ∆ + and, once again by Proposition 6.4, Sim(w) ∈ ∆ − . It follows that ψ → Sim(w) ∈ ∆ + ; but in view of upward persistence, this contradicts that ψ → Sim(w) ∈ Θ + .
3) Suppose that v w. Reasoning as above, it suffices to show that if
Thus by Proposition 6.4, Sim(v) ∈ ∆ − and by upwards persistence Sim(v) ∈ Γ − . Since Γ ∈ |M Λ | was arbitrary, the claim follows.
then ψ ∈ Γ + . If (2) holds then by Theorem 7.1, there is w ∈ |I| with (I, w) ⇀ (M Λ , Γ). By Proposition 6.4, Sim(w) ∈ Γ − , hence it follows from (2) that ψ ∈ ℓ − (w); but I is saturated and ψ ∈ Σ, so ψ ∈ ℓ + (w) and thus ψ ∈ Γ + , as required.
and assume toward a contradiction that Sim(w) ∈ Γ − . By Proposition 6.4 (I, w) ⇀ (M Λ , ∆) for some ∆ Λ Γ. Since ⇀ is a dynamic simulation, it follows that there is v ∈ |I| with w S I v and
We are now ready to define our initial quasimodel. Given a finite set Σ of formulas, we will define a quasimodel J Σ falsifying all unprovable Σ-types. This quasimodel is a substructure of I Σ , containing only moments which are possible in the following sense. With this we are ready to define our initial structure, which as we will see later is indeed a quasimodel. Definition 7.5. Let Λ be an admissible temporal logic over L ⊆ L ♦∀ . Given Σ ⋐ L, we define the initial structure for Σ by J Σ = I Σ ↾ J Σ . Remark 7.6. In principle J Σ depends on Λ, but we do not reflect this in the notation since Λ will always be either ITL 0 ♦ or ITL 0 ♦∀ , depending on whether ∀ appears in Σ. Our strategy from here on will be to show that canonical structures are indeed quasimodels; once we establish this, completeness of ITL 0 ♦ is an easy consequence. The most involved step will be showing that the successor relation on J Σ is ω-sensible, but we begin with some simpler properties. 
ω-Sensibility
In this section we will show that S J is ω-sensible, the most difficult step in proving that J = J Σ is a quasimodel. Fix an admissible temporal logic Λ over L ⊆ L ♦∀ , and let R denote the transitive, reflexive closure of S J . If w R v, we say that v is reachable from w. Since v ∈ R(w) was arbitrary, this shows that
From this we obtain the following, which evidently implies ω-sensibility: Proof. Towards a contradiction, assume that w ∈ J Σ and ♦ψ ∈ ℓ + (w) but, for all
Now let v ∈ R(w). By Proposition 7.2.1) and the assumption that ψ ∈ ℓ − (v) we have that ⊢ ψ → Sim(v), and since v was arbitrary, ⊢ ψ → wRv Sim(v). Using distributivity (ER1) we further have that ⊢ ♦ψ → ♦ wRv Sim(v). This, along with (4), shows that ⊢ ♦ψ → Sim(w); however, by Proposition 7.2.2) and our assumption that ♦ψ ∈ ℓ + (w) we have that ⊢ ♦ψ → Sim(w) → Sim(w), hence by modus ponens we obtain ⊢ Sim(w), which contradicts the assumption that w ∈ J Σ . We conclude that there can be no such w. Proof. Let J = J Σ . By Lemma 7.7, |J| is upwards closed in |I Σ | and S J is serial, while by Proposition 8.2, S J is ω-sensible. It follows from Lemma 4.9 that J is a quasimodel.
We are now ready to prove that ITL 0 ♦ is complete. Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose ϕ is an unprovable formula and let
Then, by Proposition 7.2.4) we have that ⊢ w∈W Sim(w) → ϕ; since ϕ is unprovable, it follows that some w * ∈ W is possible and hence w * ∈ J sub(ϕ) . By Corollary 8.3, J sub(ϕ) is a quasimodel, so that by Theorem 4.8, ϕ is falsifiable in some dynamical system.
The universal modality
Now let us show that ITL 0 ♦∀ is complete for the class of dynamical systems. As before our completeness proof relies on the canonical model M ITL 0 ♦∀ and the initial quasimodel J Σ (for suitable Σ), but now we cannot use these structures as they are as they are not honest (see Definition 4.3). We will first exhibit an honest substructure of M ITL 0 ♦∀ . Definition 9.1. Let Σ ⊆ L ♦∀ . We define Σ ∀ to be the set of formulas of Σ of the form Proof. It can be checked using universal excluded middle (UA1) that |M Λ [Π]| is open and using (UA6) that it is S Λ -invariant. In view of Lemma 10.9, we may moreover conclude that M Λ [Π] is a weak quasimodel.
It remains to show that M Λ [Π] is honest. That ∀ϕ ∈ Φ + ∩ Σ implies that ϕ ∈ Ψ + for all Φ, Ψ ∈ |M Λ [Π]| follows readily from the truth axiom (UA4). For the remaining condition, let us take Φ ∈ |M Λ [Π]| and let ∀ϕ ∈ Σ be such that ∀ϕ ∈ Φ − . Let Ψ ′ = (Π + , {ϕ} ∪ Π − ). Assume towards a contradiction that Ψ ′ is not consistent, so that ⊢
. From Φ ∀ = Π and axioms (UA5), (UA2) and propositional reasoning we conclude that ⊢ Π
Hence Ψ ′ is consistent. By Lemma 5.3, Ψ ′ can be extended to a prime type Ψ. Since, by construction, Π ⊆ T Ψ, we have that Ψ ∈ |M Λ [Π]| and, moreover, ϕ ∈ Ψ − , as required.
This already is sufficient to prove that our logics over L •∀ are complete. The proof of the following is analogous to that of Theorem 5.7, but using the structures M Λ [Π] instead of M Λ . Theorem 9.4. ITL 0
•∀ is complete for the class of expanding posets and ITL FS •∀ for the class of persistent posets. Remark 9.5. We will not go into detail regarding strong completeness in this article, but Theorems 5.7 and 9.4 can be strengthened to state that these logics are strongly complete. Note that logics with ♦ cannot be strongly complete since they are not compact.
For the language with ♦ we will use an honest substructure of I Σ , for which we use the following result of [19] . Lemma 9.6. Suppose that Σ ⊆ ∆ ⊆ L ♦∀ are both closed under subformulas, X is a Σ-labelled space, Y is a ∆-labelled space, and χ ⊆ |X| × |Y| is a total, surjective simulation. Then, if ℓ Y is honest, it follows that ℓ X is honest as well.
Finally, we observe that |J Σ [Π]| is a quasimodel. Proof. If ϕ is unprovable, then ϕ ∈ Φ − for some Φ ∈ |M Λ |, and by Theorem 7.1,
is an honest weak quasimodel, so that by Lemmas 9.6 and 9.7, so is J Σ [Π]. It follows by Theorem 4.8 that ϕ is falsifiable on some dynamic topological model.
Completeness for expanding posets
Our goal for this section is to show that the temporal logics of dynamic posets and of dynamical systems coincide with respect to L ♦ . We will show this by 'unwinding' a quasimodel to produce a dynamical poset. First we discuss some operations on types that will be used in the unwinding. If Σ is a set of formulas, first define Ψ /Σ = (Ψ + ∩ Σ, Ψ − ), and sub(Σ) = ϕ∈Σ sub(ϕ). With this, we have the following:
Lemma 10.1. Let Φ, Ψ, Γ, Θ be L ♦ -types and Σ ⊆ L ♦ closed under subformulas. Then, 
For item 3 we must check that each condition of Definition 4.5 holds. As an example, we work out 3). If ♦ψ ∈ Γ + , since sub(Γ + ) ⊆ Σ then ♦ψ, ψ ∈ Σ. From Γ ⊑ T Φ S T Ψ we conclude that ♦ψ ∈ Φ + and either ψ ∈ Γ + or ♦ψ ∈ Ψ + . From this it follows that either ψ ∈ Γ + or ♦ψ ∈ Ψ + ∩ Σ (which means that ♦ψ ∈ ( Ψ /Σ) + ).
Other conditions follow similar reasoning and are left to the reader.
We may also wish to 'forget' temporal formulas that have been realized. To make this precise, let sup(ϕ) denote the set of super-formulas of ϕ, i.e., sup(ϕ) = {ψ ∈ L ♦ : ϕ ∈ sub(ψ)}. Say that a formula ϕ is a temporal formula if it is of the forms •ψ or ♦ψ, and if Φ is a set of formulas, say that ϕ ∈ Φ is maximal in Φ if it does not have any temporal superformulas in Φ (except ϕ). Then, define Φ \ ϕ = (Φ + \ sup(ϕ), Φ − ).
Proof sketch. We consider the first item; the second is analogous. Assuming that •ϕ is maximal in Φ + , it must be checked that the four conditions of Definition 4.5 hold. For conditions (1)) and (3)), remark that sup(•ϕ) ∩ Φ + = {•ϕ}. Therefore if •θ or ♦θ belong to Φ + , then neither θ nor ♦θ belong to sup(•ϕ). For conditions (2) ) and (4)), it suffices to observe that
The unwinding procedure is similar to that in [19] . There, the points of the 'limit model' obtained from a quasimodel are the infinite paths satisfying all ♦-formulas in their labels. However, to obtain a poset rather than a topological space, we will instead work with finite paths.
We define a typed path (on Q) to be a sequence ((w i , Φ i )) i<n such that (w i ) i<n is a path, for all i < n, Φ i ⊑ T ℓ(w i ), and for all
We say that ((w i , Φ i )) i<n is properly typed if sub(Φ + i+1 ) ⊆ sub(Φ + i ) for all i < n − 1, and terminal if Φ + n−1 = ∅. Note that we allow Φ i ⊑ T ℓ(w i ) and not only Φ i = ℓ(w i ). This will allow us to use finite paths, as temporal formulas can be 'forgotten' once they have been realized. Definition 10.4. We define the weak limit model Q of Q as follows:
• Define | Q| to be the set of terminal typed paths on Q together with the empty path, which we denote ǫ.
The structure Q we have just defined is always a deterministic quasimodel, as we show in the following lemmas. Proof. We have to prove that Q is a partial order on | Q|, S Q is a function and that it is continuous. We prove only continuity and leave the other properties to the reader. Let α = ((w i , Φ i )) i<n and β = ((v i , Ψ i )) i<m . If α Q β then n ≤ m and for all i < n, w i v 1 and Φ i T Ψ i . If n > 0, then we also have n − 1 ≤ m − 1 and for all
, as needed. If n = 0 then α = ǫ, so that S Q (α) = ǫ and clearly ǫ Q S(β).
Next, we must show that Q has 'enough' paths. First we show that we can iterate the forward-confluence property.
Proof. First we find v i by induction on i; v 0 is already given, and once we have found v i , we use forward confluence to choose v i+1 so that v i S v i+1 and w i+1 v i+1 . Then we set Ψ i = ℓ(v i ); since S is sensible, Ψ i S T Ψ i+1 , and by Lemma 10.1.2, Φ n T Ψ n . Now we want to prove that any point can be included in a terminal typed path. For this we will first show that we can work mostly with properly typed paths, thanks to the following. Lemma 10.7. Let Q be an L ♦ -quasimodel, (w i ) i<n be a path on |Q|, and Φ 0 ⊑ ℓ(w 0 ). Then there exist (Φ i ) i<n such that ((w i , Φ i )) i<n is a properly typed path.
Proof. For i < n − 1 define recursively Φ i+1 = ℓ(wi+1) /sub(Φ + i ); by the assumption that S is sensible and Lemma 10.1, Φ i S T Φ i+1 for each i < n − 1. It is easy to see that ((w i , Φ i )) i<n thus defined is properly typed.
However, the properly typed paths we have constructed need not be terminal. This will typically require extending them to a long-enough path. The extension procedure is precisely the crux of our unwinding procedure. Lemma 10.8. If Q is an L ♦ -quasimodel, then any non-empty typed path on Q can be extended to a terminal path.
Proof. Let α = ((w i , Φ i )) i<m be any typed path on Q. For a type Φ, define Φ = |sub(Φ + )|. We proceed to prove the claim by induction on Φ m−1 . Consider first the case where Φ + m−1 contains no temporal formulas; that is, formulas of the form •ψ or ♦ψ for some ψ. In this case, using the seriality of S choose w m such that w m−1 S w m , and define Φ m+1 = (ℓ(w m ) − ; ∅); it is easy to see that ((w i , Φ i )) i≤m is a terminal path. Otherwise, let ϕ be a maximal temporal formula of Φ + m−1 , i.e., it does not appear as a proper subformula of any other temporal formula in Φ + m−1 . We consider two sub-cases.
Assume first that ϕ = •ψ. Then, by the seriality of S, we may choose w m so that w m−1 S w m . Applying Lemma 10.7, let Φ m be such that ((w m−1 , Φ m−1 ), (w m , Φ m )) is a properly typed path. Setting Φ m = Φ m \ •ψ, we see by Lemma 10.2.1) that ((w m−1 , Φ m−1 ), (w m , Φ m )) is a properly typed path, and Φ m < Φ m−1 , since the left-hand side does not count •ψ. Thus we may apply the induction hypothesis to obtain a terminal typed path ((w i , Φ i )) i<n extending α. Now consider the case where ϕ = ♦ψ. Since S is ω-sensible, there is a path w m−1 S w m S . . . S w k so that ϕ ∈ ℓ(w k ). Using the seriality of S, choose w k+1 so that w k S w k+1 . By Lemma 10.7, there are types Φ i for m ≤ i ≤ k and a type Φ k+1 such that ((w m−1 , Φ m−1 ), . . . , (w k , Φ k ), (w k+1 , Φ k+1 )) is a properly typed path. Then, define Φ k+1 = Φ k+1 \ ♦ψ. Using Lemma 10.2 we see that
Hence we can apply the induction hypothesis to obtain a terminal typed path ((w i , Φ i )) i<n extending α.
With this, we are ready to show that our unwinding is indeed a deterministic quasimodel.
Proof. We have already seen in Lemma 10.5 that (| Q|, Q , S Q ) is a dynamic poset, so it remains to check that (| Q|, Q , ℓ Q ) is a labelled frame and S Q is sensible and
First we must check that if α Q β, then ℓ Q (α) T ℓ Q (β). Consider two cases; if n > 0, then β is also of the form (v i , Ψ i ) i<m with m > 0 and by definition,
Now assume that ϕ → ψ ∈ ℓ Q (α) − . If n > 0, then since Q is a labelled frame, we can pick v 0 w 0 with ϕ ∈ ℓ(v 0 ) + and ψ ∈ ℓ(v 0 ) − . Since Φ 0 ⊑ T ℓ(w 0 ) T ℓ(v 0 ), by Lemma 10.1.2, Φ 0 T ℓ(v 0 ), so that by Lemma 10.6, there is a typed path β ′ = ((v i , Ψ i )) i<n with Ψ 0 = ℓ(v 0 ) such that w i v i and Φ i T Ψ i for all i < n. By Lemma 10.8, we can extend β ′ to a terminal path β. Then, it is easy to see that α β, ϕ ∈ ℓ Q (β) + , and ψ ∈ ℓ Q (β) − , as required.
To check that S Q is sensible, consider two cases. If S Q (α) = ǫ, then α has length at least two, but since α is a typed path, ℓ Q (α) = Φ 0 S T Φ 1 = ℓ Q S Q (α) . Otherwise, S Q (α) = ǫ; this means that either α = ǫ and thus ℓ + Q (α) = ∅, or α has length 1, in which case since α is terminal, so we also have that ℓ + Q (α) = ∅. In either case, there can be no temporal formula in ℓ + Finally we check that S Q is ω-sensible. Suppose that ♦ϕ ∈ ℓ(α) + . This means that α = ǫ, so n > 0, and since α is terminal, ♦α ∈ Φ n−1 . But this is only possible if ϕ ∈ Φ i for some i < n − 1, in which case ϕ ∈ ℓ Q S i Q (α) . Proof. Suppose that ϕ ∈ L ♦ is satisfied (falsified) on a dynamical topological model. Then, by Theorem 4.8, ϕ is satisfied (falsified) on some point w * of a sub(ϕ)-quasimodel Q. By Lemma 10.9, Q is a deterministic quasimodel, and by Lemma 10.8, (w * , ℓ(w * )) can be extended to a terminal path α * ∈ | Q|. By Lemma 4.7, α * satisfies (falsifies) ϕ on the dynamic poset model (| Q|, Q , S Q , · Q ).
As an immediate consequence of Theorems 8.4 and 10.10, we conclude that ITL 0 ♦ is complete for the class of expanding posets. 
Completeness for specific spaces
In this section we will show that the above completeness theorems already hold for some familiar spaces, which follows from known results regarding dynamic topological logic. Thus it will be convenient to briefly review DTL and how ITL embeds into it. Since the base logic of DTL is classical, we may use a simpler syntax, using the language L C given by the grammar
We can then define ¬, ∧, ∨, , ♦ using standard classical validities, and denote the ∀free sublanguage by L C . Given a dynamical system X, a classical valuation on X is a function · C : L C → P(|X|) such that
Note that valuations of formulas are no longer restricted to open sets. We then have the following results regarding satisfiability on some standard metric spaces.
Theorem 11.1 ([16] ). If ϕ ∈ L C is classicaly satisfiable on any topological space, then it is classically satisfiable on Q.
Theorem 11.2 ([11] ). If ϕ ∈ L C is classicaly satisfiable on an expanding poset, then it is classically satisfiable on R n for any n ≥ 2.
Theorem 11.3 ([16] ). If ϕ ∈ L C is classicaly satisfiable on any complete metric space, then it is classically satisfiable on the Cantor space.
Remark 11.4. Fernández-Duque [16] states Theorem 11.1 for L C , but the proof provided yields the result for all of L C . Roughly speaking, this is due to the fact that the simulations constructed in the proof are total and surjective.
Theorem 11.2 is a strengthening of a result of Slavnov [33] .
Our intuitionistic temporal logic may then be interpreted in DTL via the Gödel-Tarski translation · , defined as follows:
Definition 11.5. Given ϕ ∈ L * , we define ϕ ∈ L C recursively by setting
where ⊙ ∈ {∧, ∨} and ∈ {•, ♦, ∀}.
In words, we put in front of variables, implication and . The following can then be verified by a simple induction on ϕ:
Lemma 11.6. Let ϕ ∈ L * , and X be any dynamic topological system. Suppose that · is an intuitionistic valuation and · C a classical valuation such that, for every atom p, ( p C ) • = p . Then, for every formula ϕ, ϕ = ϕ C .
Then we obtain the following.
Theorem 11.7. Given n ≥ 2, ITL 0 ♦ is complete for R n , as well as for the Cantor space.
Proof. If ϕ is valid on R n then by Lemma 11.6 ϕ is valid on R n and hence, by Corollary 10.11, ϕ (and thus ϕ) is valid on the class of expanding posets and therefore derivable in ITL 0 ♦ . Completeness for the Cantor space follows by similar reasoning using Theorem 11.3.
By similar reasoning, but using Theorems 11.1 and 9.8, we obtain the following. 
Concluding remarks
We have provided a sound and complete axiomatization for -free fragments of intuitionistic temporal logics interpreted over various classes of dynamical systems. Many questions remain open in this direction, perhaps most notably an extension to the full language with . This is likely to be a much more challenging problem than that for ♦, as we do not even have a feasible set of axioms for Kremer's interpretation of . On the other hand, the semantics for given in [7] does satisfy the standard axioms for of classical LTL, but little else is known about it, including its decidability. Aside from ITL with 'henceforth' over the class of all dynamical systems one may consider the corresponding logics for the class of dynamical posets, for spaces with an open map, or for persistent posets; none of these logics have been axiomatized, but we know that they are all distinct [7] .
